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IN THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
,STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Resp,ondent, 
-vs.-
HARTFORD A~CCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FELT SYNDICATE, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case N o.8719 
Case No. 8720 
Case No. 8736 
BRIEF OF HARTFORD AIC'CIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY ON APPEAL 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Three cas·es which were consolidated for trial in the 
district court, have been consolidated on appeal to this 
court. The defendant in each case is the Hartford Acci-
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dent & Indemnity Company which was the surety on a 
contract bond of Cassady Company and C. P. Cassady 
. . . ' 
as principal.s. In two of these cases, it is the appellant 
and in the third case it is the respondent and cross-
appellant. In this brief we shall refer to it as the Hart-
ford. This brief is written as though the Hartford were 
the appellant in each case, since the points raised by it 
on its cross-appeal in the Felt case, are similar to those 
raised on its direct appeal in the other two cases. 
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases are the three 
na1ned obligees on the bond. The plaintiff, Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, is designated in 
the bond, as the lender obligee, and is herein referred 
to as Prudential Federal. The plaintiff Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Compan3~, is designated in the bond as 
the title obligee, and in this brief will be referred to as 
the Title Company. The plaintiff~ Felt Syndicate, Inc.~ 
is a Nevada Corporation, designated in the bond as the 
owner obligee, and is herein referred to simply as Felt. 
As above noted, the principals on the bond were 
Ca ~sady Co1np.any, Inc .. , a corporation of the State of 
lTtah, and (~. P. Cassady. For purposes of these actions, 
thP~T n1ay be considered as one, and the na1ne Cassady 
~hall hP used herein to dc·8igna te eitl1er or both unless 
by contPxt a diffPrl•nt Ulc·a.ning is c.Ie.arly n1ade to appear. 
AnotlH'r JH'r~on not .a party to this litigation, to ·which 
frPqll<'llt rpferl'llCl' \Yill be 1nade is ... A.ssoeiated Account-
ants, a co-parbH:)rship, hereinafter referred to as Ac-
countants. 
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The records on appeal 1n these cases consist of 
various p.apers, pleadings, orders, etc., filed and entered 
in each of the three cases, and a transcript of the testi-
mony and trial proceedings together with certain ex-
hibits received in evidence. In preparing the records 
on appeal, the Clerk prepared a separate folder and 
record for e.ach case insofar as the papers and plead-
ings were concerned. However, there is only one trans-
cript which is part of the record on appeal in all three 
cases. It is numbered in red numerals as part of the 
record in the Title Company case. Thus the record in 
the Title Company case as numbered and indexed by the 
Clerk, consists of 27 pages nun1bered consecutively from 
1 to 27 plus the transcript vvhose p.ages are numbered 
in red from 28 to 452. The Prudential Federal record 
consists of 54 pages numbered consecutively from 1 to 
54, and the Felt re-cord consists of 59 p~ages, numbered 
consecutively from 1 to 59. 
In order to avoid confusion all references to the 
transcript in this brief shall be indicated by the letter 
T. followed by the page number e.g. (T. 51). The num-
ber shall refer to the typewritten number rather than 
the red number. Thus page T.51 also bears the red num-
ber 79. References to the separate records of the indi-
vidual cases shall be designated by the case na1ne, the 
letter R., and the page number e.g. (Prud-Fed. R. l, 
Felt R. 7, Tit. Co. R. 3. etc.). 
THE FACTS 
These cases arise out of the following facts: 
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The promoters of Felt became interested in building 
a subdivision on a tract of land known as Morningside 
Heights Subdivision in Salt Lake County, in late 1949 or 
early 1950 (T. 228). Mr. Lloyd Broadhurst, one of the 
original promoters, contacted C. P. Cassady and C. J. 
Cassady, his son, who were builders in and around Arcad-
ia, Calif., to determine whether they would be interested 
in building a one hundred unit subdivision (T. 228). 
The Cassadys were interested, and in about February 
of 1950, they ,came to Salt Lake City for the purpose 
of examining the tract, at which time they became ac-
quainted with other promoters of Felt, and further 
di_scussed the prospective building program. (T. 229, 
305). 
At that time Felt provided the Cassadys with some 
. plans and specifications of homes to be built on the 
subdivision. The Cassadys took these plans back to their 
place of busines.s in California, and they were redrawn 
and redrafted hy Cassady's own architects. (T. 229, 
335). The purpose of this was so that Cassady would 
know exactly what materials and construction would 
be required. ( T. 335-336). After the plans and SpBcifi-
cations were redrafted by Ca.ssady they were returned 
to Mr. B. D. Scott of Felt, 'vho approved them. (T. 
231, 336, 339). S·cott submitted the plans to the \7" eterans 
Administration for approval .and subsequently the \ 7et-
erans Administration issued its certificates (Reasonable 
values; C.R.V.s.), to the effect that homes built accord-
ing to such plans and specifi~eations 'vould be approved 
for G.I. loans up to a stated value. (T. 337-340). Scott 
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advised the Cassadys that the plans and specifications 
conformed to all local requiren1ents of the Veterans Ad-
ministration and with local building codes. ( T. 231, 299). 
F·elt contemplated financing the entire project 
through .a regular lending institution. On June 16, 1950, 
it entered into a contract with Prudential Federal, here-
inafter referred to as the loan agreement, wherein the 
financial arrangements were outlined (Ex. Pr.-7). Under 
the terms of that agreement Prudential Federal agreed 
to lo.an to each owner and purchaser of the 100 lots 
in Morningside Heights Subdivision, funds in a specific 
amount, to be used in the construction and erection of a 
dwelling house and appurtenant improvements. The 
mort~age loans were to be made in accordance with the 
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, popularly 
known as the G.I. Bill of Rights. As a prerequisite to 
making the lo.an, Prudential Federal required that cer-
tain things be done, among which were the following: 
(1) that the mortgage loan be approved by Prudential 
Insurance Company of America, (not to be confused with 
Prudential Federal); (2) that an ap·proved A.T.A. Title 
insurance policy showing title to the mortg.aged real 
estate in the bororwer, free and clear of all liens and 
incumb:vances, except the lien for general taxes, be issued; 
(3) that the borrower pay a cash deposit to Prudential 
Feder.al to cover certain administrative and loan costs; 
(4) that the borrower authorize Prudential Federal in 
writing to make certain charge.s against the loan pro-
ceeds; ( 5) that the plans and survey of the homes be 
approved by the Veterans Administration; and (6) that 
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the borrower execute to Prudential Federal written 
authority to disburse the loan proceeds to pay course 
of construction costs on the home. The contract further 
provided in detail, as to the various stages of the com-
pletion of the home when disbursement of the mortgage 
loans would be made, e.g. 14% when the subfloor of 
the dwelling had been installed; 16% when the dwelling 
was to the square; 16% when the d\velling was roughed in, 
etc. (Ex. Pr-7). 
The contract further provided that all the 100 homes 
would be com_pleted within 180 days of the date of the 
agreement, and that failure on the part of Felt to com-
plete within that time, would give Prudential Federal 
the right, upon ten days written notice, and at its elec-
tion, to enter upon the real estate and complete or alter 
the dwelling house to comply with plans and _specifica-
tions and for this purpose to use all of the loan pro-
ceeds and the payments. The contract further provided 
in detail the mechanical processes by \Yhich the parties 
under the contract would function. Included among these 
provisions was a pTovision for a bonded disbursing 
agency to make disbursements of the loan proceeds among 
Cassady, F:elt and subcontractors and 1naterialmen ac-
cording to directions to be provided. Thus, Prudential 
Federal would n1ake disburse1nents to Accountants in a 
lump stun figure, and Accountants \vould then take 
the responsibility for disbursing the funds among the 
various persons entitled to then1. It \Vas specifically 
provided in paragraph 2 of Artic.Ie III that Accountants 
would .Secure fron1 all laborers and rna terial1nen and sub-
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contractors, written lien waivers at the time of making 
payment to them, said waivers to cover in toto the 
amount of the particular disburse·ment of the loan pro-
ceeds made by Prudential Federal to Accountants. The 
contract then provided "such lien waivers shall be de-
livered to Prudential prior to any further disbursement 
by Prudential and Prudential will be under no obligation 
to make further disbursements until it .shall have re-
ceived lien waivers covering all p·rior disbursements." 
(Ex. Pr-7). (Emphasis ours). 
Prior to the execution of the foregoing contract, 
construction work on a few homes had commenced some 
time in May or June of 1950. ( T. 33, 59, 60, 318-319, 324). 
It appears that basement excavations had been dug upon 
perhaps a dozen or two of the 100 units. (T. 33, 59, 60, 
318-319, 324). This work was performed by one Ross, a 
subcont~actor. of Felt and not of Cassady. (T. 330). Dur-
ing this period of ti1ne however, Cassady was negotiat-
ing with Felt for a construction contr.act. (T. 328). 
A serious problem which entered into the negotia-
tions was lack of adequate financing on the part of 
Cassady. (T. 37, 324, 326, 328). Cassady originally pro-
posed to furnish what is known as a supervisal bond in 
the penal sum of $100,000. (Depositions of C. P. Cassady, 
Deco Van Horn, Jr., and A. L. Blackburn, Exs. 39, 40, 
41; T. 232). However, this was not acceptable to Pruden-
tial Fede·ral. (T. 35, 412). Prudential Federal's attorneys 
prepared a form of bond which they deemed adequate 
for the protection of their intere.st and which was de-
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livered to C.assady, and by him to his insurance agent 
in California. (T. 401, 403-405, 408, 419, 420; Exs. 38, 
39, 40, 41). The bond finally issued by the Hartford 
was, in all respects material to this litigation, in the 
same form as the bond prepared by Prudential Federal's 
attorney. (Ex. Pr-7, H-38). 
During this pe-riod of time Felt was negotiating with 
another contr.actor, and until the time Ca.ssady actually 
signed the construction contract, it was questionable 
whether ~c·assady or the other ·contractor would event-
ually get the job of building the 100 homes. (T. 328, 329). 
Finally these problems were worked out to the satis-
faction of the various parties, and on July 19, 1950, 
Cassady entered into a contract with Felt, which is here-
in.after referred to a.s the Construction Contract. (Ex. 
Pr-2). Under the terms of that agreement, Cassady 
agreed "to supervise, co-ordinate and procure, the con-
struction of a total of 100 houses upon contiguous lots," 
(emphasis ours), in Morningside Heights Subdivision. 
It w~s agreed that such homes would be built in strict 
conformity with the plans and specifications, and in 
conformity with any plans, duties and obligations re-
quired by any governmental agency having the right 
to demand that said work should be performed in the 
manner sp·e'cified by sueh agency, and also in accordance 
with the rules and regul_ations of the Veterans Adminis-
tration. By p.aragraph 15 it 'Yas provided that neither 
party would ~ssign, transfer or pledge, in whole or in 
part, the agreement or any of its rights or obligations 
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the-reunder. without the written consent of the other 
party first had and obtained. (Ex. Pr-2). 
By paragraph 2.2, the number of houses to be built 
acording to each basic floor plan was specified, together 
with the cost per unit and it was further provided in 
said paragraph that if the parties should thereafter 
agree to any change or altera.tion.s in the plans or specifi-
c.ations, and if such change should increase the cost of 
construction of the unit affected by such change, such 
inereased cost would be added to the cost per house 
therein agreed upon. (Ex. Pr-2). 
Paragraph 23 provided among other things, the 
schedule of payments following the cour.se of construc-
tion schedule. This is at slight variance with the schedule 
of payments set forth in the loan agreement. This p~ara­
gr.aph further provided inspections would be made at 
intervals not to exceed 15 days, and that the payments 
therein provided would be made within five days after 
the inspection. It was further provided as follows : "The 
foregoing schedule is to be used as a general guide. How-
ever, it is agreed that disbursements will be made to 
second party and the subcontractors in accordance with 
the actual stage of completion of each dwelling within 
five days after the inspections are made." (Emphasis 
ours). 
By paragraph 24 of the same agreement Felt obli-
gated itself to furnish and p·rocure ,a power connection. 
By paragraph 26, Cassady agreed to commence con-
struction under the contract within ten days from the 
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date of execution, and to cause the same to be carried 
forward diligently and expeditiously until all of the 100 
houses h.ad been completed, and to complete all of the 
100 houses within 180 days from the date of execution 
of the agreement. (Ex. Pr-2). 
On July 21, the Hartford issued its bond naming 
the three plaintiffs as obligees. (Ex. Pr-1). The last 
whereas clause of the bond recites: 
"WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE, TITLE 
OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE each de.sire protec-
tion as their interest may apear, in the event of default 
by the PRINCIPAL under said contr.act, said protec-
tion to be subject to the performance by the LE};1DER 
OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE and the OTr}'ER 
OBLIGEE of their respective obligat·ions to the PRIN-
CIPAL in connection with said contract; .... " (Empha-
sis ours). 
The bond was conditioned as follows: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of 
this obligation is such that, if the PRINCIPAL 
well and truly p·erforn1s all of the undertakings, 
covenants, conditions and agreen1ents of said con-
tr.act on its part and fully indemnifies and saves 
harmless the obligees from alllos.s, costs, damage, 
and exp~ense which they may suffer, either jointly 
and severally, by reason of failure so to do, and 
fully reimburses and repays obligees all outlay 
and expense which said obligees may incur in 
making good any such default~ and further, if 
the PRINCIPAL shall pay all persons who have 
contracted, or will have contracted, directly with 
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PRINCIPAL for services or labor or materials 
furnished under the provisions of said contract, 
and shall keep and maintain each lot or building-
site free .and clear of labor and materiallien.s, then 
this obligation shall be void; otherwise, it shall 
remain in full force and effect." (Ex. Pr-1). 
On page 2 of the bond the following provision 3 
was set forth: 
"The SURETY shall not be liable under the 
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, unless 
the Obligees, or either of them , shall make pay-
ment to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compli-
ance with the terms of said contract as to pay-
ments, and each shall perform all other obligations 
to be performed by each obligee under said con-
tract at the time and in the manner therein set 
forth." (Emphasis ours.) 
The provision last quoted, is of crucial importance 
to the determination of these cases. It is significant 
that this language i.s identical to that contained in the 
bond form pTepared by Prudential Federal's attorneys. 
It is Prudential Federal's language. (Ex. Pr-8, Pr-38). 
On August 10, 1950, Felt, Cassady, Accountants and 
Prudential Federal entered into a four party agreement, 
hereinafter referred to as the disbursal agreement. (Ex. 
Pr-8). This agreement provided in detail for the me-
chanics of disbur.sing the mortgage funds among the 
various parties entitled to receive the same. Paragraph 
4 thereof reiterated the provisions of the loan agree-
ment, requiring Accountants to obtain lien waivers from 
the laborers .and materialmen, and to deliver the same 
to Prudential Federal before the latter firm would be 
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under any obligation to make further disbursements of 
loan proceeds. Paragraph 6 provided that in the event 
that inspections made by the Veterans Administration 
and Prudential Feder.al would disclose that the con-
struction of any dwelling did not conform with the plans 
and specifications, Prudential Federal might withhold 
further disbursements of funds in connection with such 
dwelling house until corrections have been made to 
make such dwelling conform with plans and _specifica-
tions. (Ex. Pr-8). Paragraph 5, together with Exhibit 
B attached to said agreement, provided in minute detail 
as to the exact percentage of completion represented 
by each phase of the work; and further provided that 
work should be inspected every two weeks, and that 
within five days thereafter Cassady should be paid for 
work done to the date of inspection. For example, exca-
v.ation and grading repre.sented 1.82% of the total work; 
concrete foundation represented 4.17% of the work; and 
the foundation complete represented 9.09% of the work. 
Under the terms of this agreement, as well as under 
the terms of the construction agreen1ent, Cassady \vas 
entitled to be paid the exact percentage \vhich he had 
earned up to the time of each inspection. 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 provided for con1pensation 
of Accountants by Ca.ssady, and Felt. Paragraph 13 
provided that the compensation provided was based upon 
the assumption that inspections \vould be made not 
oftener than two weeks, and that there would be 12 to 
14 periods of disbursement. In the event of more fre-
quent insp.ections, or 1nore disbu1~sement periods than 
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14, Accountants would be paid a reasonable compensation 
for such additional work. (Ex. Pr-8). 
Promptly upon the execution of the construction 
agreement Cassady entered upon the performance of 
his obligations thereunder. (T. 232, 233, 332). He im-
mediately ran into difficulties. (T. 233). Felt f.ailed to 
provide a power connection which it had agreed to pro-
vide in the construction agreement. ( T. 197, 233, 313 ; 
Ex. H-32). As a re.sult, Cassady was put to the expense 
of procuring a gasoline po\vered electric generator at 
a cost to him of $2,137.44. (T. 197, 233, 240; Ex. H-32). 
Water was not .available as agreed and surveys were 
slow. (T. 233). 
More serious, was the failure of Felt's sales pro-
gram to keep pace with the construction progran1. Al-
though C~ssady understood that the homes were prac-
tically all sold at the time th·e construetion agreement 
was entered into, such was not the case. (T. 233, 257). 
Prudential Federal refused to disburse loan proceeds 
for any particular unit until an A. T .A. title policy had 
issued, and a mortgage had been executed by the pur-
chaser-borrower and recorded. (T. 250). In some in-
stance.s this was not .accomplished until December of 
1950, at a time when the construction work should have 
been virtually completed. ( T. 38, 62, 105 ; Ex. Pr-36). 
This problem was further aggravated by cancellations 
by some veteran borrowers due to delay in prosecuting 
the work, thus occasioning further delay in locating, 
selling and signing a new veteran borrower. (T. 39, 323). 
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There were also cancellations and delays due to the 
Prudential Insurance Company refusing to approve some 
of the veteran purchasers. ( T. 322, 323). 
From the very outset there was a deficiency of 
monies. (T. 64, 65, 67, 235, 236, 2'58, 321, 347; Ex.s H-
13-15). The project was "thirsting'' for neeessary money. 
( T. 64). At the time of the fir.st insp·ection Cassady 
received but .a very small fraction of the funds he was 
entitled to receive· in accordance with the actual stage of 
construction. (T. 235, 258, Ex. H-32). After one month 
of work, Cassady had earned approximately $80,000 
and had been paid only about $7,000. (Ex. H-32). He 
of course, made complaint .about this, but there was 
no other money available at that time because the sales 
program and mortgage recording program were badly 
behind schedule. (T. 62, 65, 67, 262, 347; Ex.s H-32-H-
34, Pr-36). 
The project wa.s designed to be accomplished by mass 
production methods. Cassady could not economically 
jump about the project from lot to lot as n1ortgages 
were recorded. Econon1ical completion 'vithin the time 
contemplated by the contract, den1anded that the houses 
be built in straight line order. (T. 332). Not having 
received the monies to "\vhich he was entitled, Cassady 
did not have .sufficient funds to p.ay his laborers and 
material suppliers. (T. 66, 67, 236, 347: Exs. H-32-33). 
They became dissatisfied and threatened to discontinue 
furnishing labor and nu1terials. ( T. 67, 236, 268: Exs. 
H-13-15). The condition persisted, and the attitude of 
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the subcontractors and materialmen bec.ame more diffi-
cult. (T. 67, 236; Ex.s H-32-33). Many of the1n refu.sed 
to continue performance and Cassady was required to 
find other materialmen in lieu thereof. ( T. 236; Ex.s 
H-32, 33). 
A good example of how this worked out is a random 
sample taken by the witness H. M. C.alvert from the 
records of Prudential Federal. The first payment or 
disbursement of mortgage funds on Lot No. 161 was 
$3,398.40. (T. 378; Ex. Pr-36). The amount of this pay-
ment indicates that the home was more than one-third 
completed at that time. Under Cassady's contract he 
would have been entitled to several progress payments 
before that time. (T. 379). How-ever, because no mort-
gage had been reeorded, he did not receive these badly 
needed payments, at the time when they -vvould have 
done the Inost good. (T. 250, 251, 378-379). The exact 
language of Mr. Cassady on this point, colorfully, if 
not grammatically, describes the problem. 
"A. The tract was started in July or the 
first of August of 1950. Due to lack of payments 
from that period of time u.ntil the end of the year 
caused the tract to be the complete fiasco that 
it was. By that I me.an in time. Once a tract and 
once a situation i.s involved such that adequate 
financing is not given, as per agreed upon, the 
men doing the work would have to go out and 
seek some othe·r means of finding money to meet 
their immediate needs. This happeoned espe-cially 
at a had time; because of the Korean War sup-
plies and materials be!came scarce. If supply 
houses were not getting money at the proper 
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time, they were not going to advance but so much 
credit. Th·e whole transaction and project was not 
only hampered, but you might say, the conclusion 
that has come about because of the lack of p~roper 
and adequate financing, according to the contract, 
regardless of any subsequent action - I mean, 
nothing could change that lemon into an orange. 
I mean you just don't make those changes. The 
whole hinge of that tract for six-months' tjme 
because of that type of financing, was the ulti-
mate cour.se of how it went." (T. 236-7). (Empha-
sis ours.) 
All of this occurred at a particularly inopportune 
time. The Korean War had broken out in June of 1950 
with a resultant scarcity in building materials. (T. 158, 
236-237). Suppliers were naturally n1ore willing to serve 
those who could pay cash. (T. 158, 236-237). Although 
Cassady had contracts with most of his laborers and 
materialmen, they ju_stifiably refused to perform when 
they could not be paid. (T. 236-37; Exs. H-32,33). Cas-
sady then had to go into the open market and make 
purchases at prices inflated by wartime pressures. He 
estimated the cost of this at $17,500. (T. 24-±). He 'vas 
further handicapped by not having the funds to buy 
in wholesale quantities, and to achieve the benefit of 
discount.s for cash sales. (T. 158, 2±4). This could have 
amounted to a "considerable saving." (T. 158). The 
gravity of the situation 'vas recognized by all concerned 
with the project. (Exs. H-13, 1±, 15). Cassady complained 
to Accountants that ·every disbursal ""'"as insufficient. 
(Ex. H-34). He repeatedly wrote to Felt, .advising it, of 
the situation and pointing out that the succes.s of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
project was imperiled. (Exs. H-13, 14, 15). Felt likewise 
recognized the gravity of the situation and directed it 
to the attention of Prudential Federal. (Exs. fi-13, 14, 
15). Notwithstanding this, the situation failed to im-
prove materially. (T. 236). 
Eventually Cass.ady found it necessary to engage 
the services of attorneys to bring the matter to a head. 
(T. 268; Ex. H-32). The attorneys wrote letters to Felt 
(T. 268; Ex. I-I-32), and this finally resulted in the exe-
cution of a supplementary and modifying agreement 
dated S·eptembe~r 20, 1950. (Ex. Pr-5). By the provisions 
of that agreement, the period for completion was ex-
tended to 210 days from the date of the original con-
struction agreement. (Ex. Pr-5). No other changes were 
made. 
The execution of this agreement did not materially 
improve the situation. ( T. 236, 268). The sales p~rogram 
and mortgage recording program continually lagged be-
hind the progre.ss of construction and this condition 
persisted throughout the fall of 1950. ( T. 64, 65, 67, 
236, 268; Ex. Pr-36). 
Notwithstanding the financial difficulties and other 
hardships and impediments resulting from Felt's 
breaches, Cassady attempted to go forward and com-
plete the project. Initially satisfactory progress was 
maintained. ( T. 141, 259-2.60). Although delays were en-
countered, the rough work was completed satisfactorily. 
(T. 69, 141, 145, 155, 259; Ex. F-24). So far as the record 
shows all of the 100 houses passed their first inspection 
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satisfactorily and most of them passed the second inspec-
tion satisfactorily. (Ex. F-24). Note: Ex. F-24 does not 
contain first .and second inspection reports for all of 
the 100 homes. However, all those in the record show 
full compliance with the first inspection, and mo.st of 
them show compliance with the second inspection. 
However, as time went on, difficulties increased. 
c·assady had difficulty in meeting obligations to sub-
contractors and materialmen due to insufficiency of 
progress payments to him. Organiz.ation broke down 
and gave '\vay to chaos. (T. 157, 158). The inevitable re-
sult \vas that the quality of work deteriorated. For ex-
ample, substandard materials were furnished by dis-
satisfied material suppliers; lumber \vas not promptly 
worked giving rise to problems of deterioration by 
weather and theft; and lumber, p·roperly installed, was 
not promptly painted, causing warping, etc. (T. 153-
155). Although the.se defects were noted by the inspector, 
and due notice thereof was given to Prudential Federal, 
it did not hold up any progress payments, and did abso-
lutely nothing to require compliance "~th \' . ..._:\_. standards 
by Cassady. (T. 68, 70, 71, 156, 157; Ex. F-34). The 
errors were thus compounded and piled one on top of 
the other. 
Another difficulty resulting fron1 the delays in pay-
ment and extension of time for building the homes, 
was that mortgage funds \Yhich should have been used for 
construction work were necessarily diverted to course of 
construction interest. At the inception of the project, the 
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veteran borrowers were required to pay .a deposit \vhich 
included enough to cover anticipated interest on the 
borrowed moneys during the anticipated and scheduled 
course of construction. (Ex. Pr-7). I-Iowever, because 
the time for completion was so long delayed, a portion 
of the loan proceeds had to be applied for this purpose. 
In other words, course of construction interest became 
a much larger item than originally planned and contenl-
plated. As a result approximately $16,000 of money 
which should have been available for payment of con-
struction costs, went out of one pocket of Prudential 
Federal and into the other as course of construction 
intere,st. ( T. 177-184) . 
By February of 1951, the project had completely 
bogged down. On February 16, 1951, Prudential Federal, 
Felt, Cassady and Accountants, entered into a new agree-
ment hereinafter called the Supplemental Agreement. 
(Ex. Pr-6). By the terms of that agreement the period 
for completion of the construction was e~xtended to 
June 1, 1951. All of the prior agreements of the several 
parties were amended to conform to that. Accountants 
were relieved of further obligation to make disburse-
ments and it was provided that from that time on Pru-
dential Federal would disburse the mortgage funds "in 
such manner and in such amounts as in the sole judgment 
and discretion of Prudential is necessary and proper 
to secure the expeditious completion of the aforesaid 
dwelling houses . . . The discretion of Prudential as to 
the time manner and method and amount of payments 
' 
shall be conclusive, and shall be binding upon the parties 
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hereto." (Emphasis ours..) Pru·dential Federal's right to 
declare the project in default by serving a ten day "\Vrit-
ten notice on Felt wa.s preserved. The Hartford con-
sented to the execution of this agreement to the extent 
that it modified the construction contract of July, 1950. 
(Ex. Pr-6). 
From the date of the supplemental agreement, to 
February of 1952, there is something of a hiatus in 
the record. There is little evidence to show what trans-
pired during that period of time. From Ex. F-24, it 
appe&rs that the homes were substantially completed 
during this period. In a large percentage of the cases 
they were occupied by the purchasers. (T. 190). Ho·wr-
ever, none of them had been completed to the satisfaction 
of the Veterans Administration. At that time, Mr. Wil-
son E. Taylor, Attorney in charge of surety bond claims 
for the Hartford, came to Salt Lake from San Francisco 
to determine the status. of the matter, and wl1at could 
be done to bring it to a conclusion. (T. 82, 187-198, 251, 
265). At that time, it appeared that there was approxi-
mately $22,500 undisbursed from the 1nortgage proceeds. 
(T. 82, 84, 85, 126, 251, 376). It "\Yas estin1ated by the 
Veteran.s Ad1ninistration inspector that the several 
homes in the tract could be con1pleted in accordance 
with V. A. require1nents at a eost of approximately 
$26,500. (T. 190, ~15). Cassady \vas \Yithout funds to 
proceed. ( T. 215). All parties \Yere agreed that the funds 
remaining undisbursed should be .applied to this pur-
pose, and that every effort should be 1nade to complete 
the homes and obtain \T. A. approval. (T. 87, 191, 193, 
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264). Felt then indicated that it had made an assign-
ment of its rights under the construction contract to 
Wright-Wirthlin, a re.al estate agency. ( T. 85, 86, 193, 
221; Ex. H-31). This was vvithout the consent of Cassady. 
(T. 238). The realtors were unwilling to subordinate 
their rights, and therefore, the funds which Felt would 
be entitled to receive under the construction contract, 
could not be made available except by going through the 
procedure of declaring Felt in default in accordance 
with the lo.an agreement. (T. 191, 193, 194-195). It was 
contemplated that this procedure would be followed but 
nothing in thi.s direction was accomplished by Prudential 
Federal until "very late in the game," (August 12, 1952) 
when it finally got around to serving notice of default. 
(T. 73, 95-97; Ex. Pr-30). 
Also, in February of 1952, the matter of ~extra ex-
penses incurred and work performed by Cass.ady was 
discussed at a meeting of interested parties. Cassady 
presented a long list of extra :expenses for which he had 
not been reimbursed. (T. 87, 195-198, 278). No repre-
sentative of Felt raised any objection to the claimed 
extras. Mr. Snyder said merely, that Felt had no funds 
with which to pay the same. (T. 198). Mr. Thomas Tay-
lor, of Prudential Federal testified that many of the 
items appeared to him to be entirely justifiable. ( T. 87). 
Although there is a conflict in the record, as to whether 
certain of the claimed items of extra.s should properly 
be allowed, there are certain items about which there 
appears to be no dispute, among which are the follow-
Ing: 
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Under the disbursing agreement of August 10, 1950, 
(Ex. Pr-8), it was contemplated that the project would 
be completed within the 180 days provided in the original 
construction contract, and that Associated Accountants, 
the bonded disbursing agency, would have to make no 
more than 12 to 14 disbursals. (Par. 13, disbursal agree-
ment.) However, the project got bogged do,vn immed-
iately, and in September of 1950, the time for comple-
tion was extended. (Ex. Pr-5). Also, because of irregular 
inspections made in the initial phases, disbursals had 
to be made more frequently than every two weeks, during 
the early phases of construction. Because of this fact, 
Accountants was required to make many- more than 
the 12 to 14 disbursals contemplated in the original 
disbursal agreement for ,,~hich it was entitled to extra 
compensation. (Par. 13, disbursal agreement). Under the 
terms of the disbursal agreement, Cassady- was partially 
responsible for Accountant's fees, including the extra 
compensation for extra disbursals. Therefore, because 
of the delays caused by slo\vness of payn1ents to Cas-
sady, ·extra disbursal periods "Tere required, \Yhich re-
sulted in an extra disbursal expense to Accountants. 
Although Accountants originally clanned a n1uch larger 
fee, it was finally settled by Cassady for a figure be-
tween $4:,000 and $5,000. ( T. 197.. :260). X o other party 
to this litigation has questioned this as a legiti1nate eA'ira. 
It is undisputed, that there \Yere son1e reYisions 
in the house plans, and that n1ore of the more expensive 
and less of the less expensive type of ho1nes \Yere to be 
built. ( T. 2±~, ~-t~). The nu1nber of the different floor 
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plans and elevations to be built was not definitely estab-
lished until September 27, 1950, more than t\vo months 
after commencement of the project. (Ex. H-32). Thus, 
Cassady had not only the additional expense of addi-
tional units of the more expensive type, but actually 
two months delay in getting final instruction.s as to the 
number of ·each type of unit to be constructed. Here 
was another item of extra expense incurred by Cassady, 
undisputed by any other party, for which he was never 
reimbursed. ( T. 242). 
Cassady sustained a substantial loss of buying 
power due to lack of payments as per contract. This 
was estimated by him as over $17,500. It resulted in 
two ways. Contractors with whom he had contracts were 
not paid on schedule. Due to the Korean War, ,and a 
shortage of materials, they refused to complete their con-
tracts, since they were not being paid for the materials 
which they had furnished and they could get a better 
price for them elsewhere. It thus become necessary to 
buy the materials on the open market, at a higher price, 
stimulated by the Korean War. Secondly, it was impos·-
sible to take advantage of cash di.scounts, which were 
available upon prompt payment for materials bought 
in large quantities. (T. 244.) (See also letters in Exs. 
H-32, H-33.) 
Cassady also found it necessary to borrow money 
from Peter Shelby in the approximate amount of $30,000. 
This ,again was due to the failure of Felt to make pay-
ments timely. (T. 245). This is another item of extra 
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expense which is undisputed in the record and for which 
Cassady was neve·r reimbursed. 
In August, 1952, the obligees served notice of de-
fault on Cassady and the Hartford. (Ex. Pr-30). In 
response thereto, the Hartford, through Wilson Taylor, 
by letter addre_ssed to Prudential Feder.al's attorney, 
advised that since Felt Syndinate had not lived up to 
its contractural obligations, and "as the rights of Pru-
dential Federal Savings & Loan Association under the 
bond . . . are contingent upon Felt . . . fulfilling all its 
obligations" the Hartford would have no obligation to 
comply with the demands of the letter. (Ex. H-29). Pru-
dential Federal responded to this letter, but made no 
dissent to the interpretation placed upon the bond by 
the Hartford. (Ex. H-28, T. 206). 
Later that month, and pursuant to arrangements 
previously made, Prudential Federal's attorney visited 
Wilson Taylor in S.an Francisco to discuss this matter. 
( T. 201). Mr. Taylor expressed the ·vie"\Y that "the rights 
of Prudential [Federal] under the bond ".,.ere contin-
gent upon Felt and the title company both fulfilling their 
·contracts with Cassady." (T. 204). Prudential Federal's 
.attorney concurred saying, •'you are probably right." 
(T. 205, 219). 
On October 8, 1952, the \' eterans AdJ.ninistration 
fin:ally rejeeted each ru1d all of the 100 ho1nes, and gave 
final refusal to approve any of then1 for G. I. loans. 
(T. 11, 12, 17, 41, 53, 104, 110, 142, 154). 
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In April of 1953, Welch Planning Mill filed an ac-
tion against Prudential Federal and Felt and the various 
100 home owners, to recover monies due it for furn-
ishing materials to the job, .and to foreclose its material-
man's lien claims against the project. Subsequently other 
lien claimants intervened, and eventually claims in the 
total sum of approximately $30,000 were filed. The Hart-
ford vvas also interpleaded as a third party defendant. 
That litigation was eventually terminated in October 
of 1955 by a compromise settlement whereby Prudential 
Federal and the Hartford each contributed $10,000 in 
full satisfaction of all claims of materialmen, and also 
all ·claims of the home owners for defective workman-
ship, etc. There was never an adjudication as to the 
merits of any of these claims, and none of the defend-
ants in the prior litigation ever .admitted legal liability 
to any of the plaintiffs or cross-claimants. (Tit. Co. R. 
2, 7' 12, 19) . 
Within the six month period allowed by the bond, 
each of the three plaintiffs filed their respective suits 
against the Hartford to recover on the bond. (Tit. Co. 
R. 1; Prud. Fed. R. 1; Felt, R. 1). The suits were duly 
consolidated for trial before the Hon. A. H. Ellett. Two 
pretrials were held (T. 1-16, 17-21), after which the 
cases c;ame regularly on for trial in Dece·mber of 1956. 
(T. 22). Evidence was taken for a period of three days, 
after which tim~, further evidence, by way of depositions, 
was taken in Los Angeles. (Exs. 39, 40, 41). The cases 
were finally argued in March of 1957, after which the 
court entered judgments in favor of each of the plain-
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tiffs and against the defendant. (T. 424; Tit. Co. R. 22; 
Prud. Fed. R. 41-42; Felt R. 45-47). Motions to amend 
the findings of fact and conclu_sions of law and to set 
aside the judgments or in the alternative for a new trial 
were duly made by the Hartford in each of the three 
cases. (Tit. Co. R. 14-15; Prud-Fed. R. 43-47; Felt R. 
48-50). Some minor modifications vrere made in the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of la\v in the Prudential 
Federal case, and the amount of the judgment was re-
duced. (Prud. Fed. R. 48, 49, 50). Otherwise the findings, 
conclusions and judgment~ were not disturbed. (Tit. Co. 
R. 16; Prud. Fed. R. 48; Felt R. 51). 
At the outset of the l\Iorningside Heights Building 
program Felt, a Nevada corporation was duly qualified 
to do business in Utah, having qualified on :Jlarch 28, 
1950. However, prior to the litigation in\olnng the lien 
claimants, on September 2, 1952, its franchise 1\:--as for-
feited for non-payment of taxes. It \Yas reinstated on 
January 7, 195±, but its franchise \Yas again forfeited 
on March 21, 1956, during the progress of the instant 
litigation, and \Yas never reinstated. ( T. 135, 138, 139, 
278-9; Ex. H-23). 
The an1ount of dan1ages a\Yarded to the plaintiffs 
Prudential Federal and Felt is not in issue in this appeal, 
and we therefore do not detail the basis on vrhich danl-
age,s to those t'vo plaintiffs '""ere determined. 
The only loss of any kind sustained by the Title 
Cornpany 'vas the expense incurred by it in defending 
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the original lien claim suit on behalf of Prudential Fed-
eral. ( T. 173). This included both court costs and at-
torney fees. Under the terms of its policy it w.as obli-
gated to defend Prudential Federal's title. (T. 173). 
This was true regardless of whether there was any merit 
to the lien claims. ( T. 173). Had the clain1s been wholly 
groundless the title company would still have had the 
obligation of defending them. It, however, contributed 
nothing toward the settlement of the lien claims. Its loss 
resulted wholly from its contractual obligations to Pru-
dential Federal, and not to any default on the part of 
the Hartford's principal. (Tit. Co. R. 12-13, T. 173). 
In summary, Cassady contracted to supervise, co-
ordinate and procure the construction of one hundred 
homes for Felt in accordance with V. A. requirem,ents. 
The H.artford executed a performance bond. Prudential 
Federal agreed to loan the necessary monies upon the 
performance of certain conditions precedent. Felt failed 
to make progress payments to Cassady in accordance 
with its contractual agreement, and otherwise breached 
its contract. As a result Cassady was unable to complete 
the one hundred homes in accordance with V. A. re-
quirements. Prudential Federal did nothing to protect 
its own interest and permitted the project to "go to 
pot" when it had the means to s.ave it and prevent sub-
stantial loss. The Hartford's bond specifically exoner-
ated it from liability to all obligees in the event of br,each 
on the part of either or any of them. The Hartford there-
fore contends that the judgments below should be re-
versed. 
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POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
POINT I. 
THE COURT MADE FINDINGS OF FACT IN ALL 
THREE CASES WHOLLY UNSUPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE, AND THEREFORE ·CONTRARY TO LAW. 
POINT II. 
FELT WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MATER-
IAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
TO 'THE HARTFORD'S PRINCIPAL, WHICH BREA:CHES 
CONTRIBU·TED TO •CAUSE THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUS-
TAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGA-
TION. 
POINT III. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTAN-
TIAL AND MA'TERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRAC-
TUAL OBLIGATIONS, AND FAILED TO TAKE STEPS TO 
PREVEN·T OR MINIMIZE THE DAMAGES, WHICH CON-
TRIBU'TED TO CAUSE 'THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUS-
TAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGA-
TION. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DREW ERRONEOUS ·CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, BASED UPON FACTS UNSUPPORTED BY EVI-
DENCE, AND CONTRARY TO F ... ~MILIAR PRINCIPLES OF 
LAW. 
POINT V. 
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND, A 
BREACH UPON THE PART OF ANY OF THE OBLIGEES, 
WOULD DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL, AND THERE-
FOR.E THE BREACHES ON THE PART OF BOTH FELT 
AND PRUDEN'TIAL DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL OBLI-
GEES. 
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'POIN'T VI. 
FELT BEING A NON-RESIDEN'T CORPORA'TION AND 
HAVING FORFEITED ITS 1CORPOR~TE FRANCHISE TO 
DO BUSINESS IN THIS STATE, HAS NO STANDING TO 
MAINTAIN ITS ACTION IN THE UTAH COURTS. 
POINT VII. 
THE 'TITLE COMPANY DID NOT SUSTAIN ANY COM-
PENSABLE DAMAGE, AND THEREFORE IS NO'T EN-




THE COURT MADE FINDINGS OF F AC'T IN ALL 
THREE CASES WHOLLY UNSUPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE, AND THEREFORE ·CONTRARY TO LAW. 
In its motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of L.aw in each of the three cases before the 
court, the Hartford point~ed out specifically and in de-
tail, wherein the court made Findings of Fact wholly 
unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to the great 
weight of the evidence. (Tit. Co. R. 14-15; Prud. Fed. 
R. 43-47; Felt R. 48-50). We refer to those motions for 
a detailed statement as to errors thus made. It is not 
ne-cessary to repeat all of that here. Some of the Find-
ings which we attacked were of little or no significance. 
Some of the Findings in the Prudential Federal case 
were substantially modified by the court. However, so 
that there may be no supposition by the Court, that we 
tacitly acquiesce in any of the Court's Findings which 
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we have heretofore attacked, and which have not subse-
quently been amended or stricken, we wish to state here, 
that we do not waive any such defects nor do we acquie.sce 
in them. In general, they will be discussed in connection 
with other points in this brief. A few of them are of 
such major importance that we believe that our excep-
tions to them should at least be noted here although 
they will be discussed in greater detail under later points. 
(a) Finding No. 4 in the Prudential Federal Case 
to the effect that Felt was "at all time.s material" to 
the cas·e, qualified to carry on business in the State of 
Utah, and Finding No. 1 in the Felt case, to the same 
general effect, are wholly contrary to the evidence. 
The status of Felt was stipulated by its attorneys and 
by the Hartford's attorney and further demonstrated 
by a certificate from the Secretar~~ of State of Utah 
showing it not to be in good standing at the time of trial. 
There is no evidence to the contrary-. The importance 
of this will be demonstrated under Point \---I. 
(b) By the last sentence of Finding X o. 27 in the 
Prudential Federal ·case, the court finds there is no 
evidence that Prudential Federal~s failure to eollect lien 
waivers fron1 Accountants resulted in any drunage or 
prejudice to the flartford or Cassady. The record shows 
without dispute that lien elai1ns in exeess of $30,000 
were asserted and filed by y,arious laborers~ sucontrac-
tors and 1nateriahnen; that Prudential Federal "~as un-
able to defeat ~neh elain1s by producing lien "\Yaivers, 
and that by reason thereof, such clailns "'"ere eventually 
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compromised .and settled by the payment by both Pru-
dential Federal and the Hartford of the sum of $10,000 
each, to the lien claimants. We believe that a $10,000 
loss must be regarded as substantial prejudice. 
(c) By Finding No. 29 in the Prudential Federal 
case and Finding No. 18 in the Felt Case, the court 
.apparently determined that Cassady should not have 
commenced work until all of the mortgages had been 
executed and re·corded. This would have meant that work 
would not have been commenced until December of 1950. 
(T. 38, 62, 106). I-Iowever, the evidence shows that some· 
of the Veteran purcha.sers became dissatisfied at the 
slow rate of progress of the project, and cancelled their 
loan .agreements. (T. 39, 62). This made it necessary 
to locate and sell to a new Veteran purchaser-borrower. 
(T. 39, 62, 323). Certainly if Cassady had not started 
work until December of 1950, there would have been 
more cancellations, and the program would have been 
further delayed. Moreover, under the construction con-
tr.act, (Ex. Pr-2, Par. 26), Cassady was obligated to 
commence construction work within ten days, and to 
complete the homes within 180 days. Under paragraph 
23 of the same agreement, Felt was obligated to make 
disbursements to Cassady according to the "actual stage 
of ·completion" of the work. There is no provision or 
li1nitation in the construction contr.act or the disbursal 
contract, that payments shall depend upon Felt's sales 
program, or upon mortgage monies being made available. 
The agreem·ent to pay is unqualified, unconditional and 
unambiguous. There c.an be no doubt that in order to 
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get the job done within the time stipulated by the con-
tract Cassady had to rely upon Felt's promise to pay 
according to the actual stage of completion. The evi-
dence shows without dispute, that in order for the 
work to have been accomplished within the time contem-
plated by the contract, that it was neces.sary that it be 
promptly commenced and prosecuted in an orderly fash-
ion .It could not have been done by skipping about the 
subdivision doing a home here and a home there as the 
homes were sold. The entire success of the project de-
pended upon mass production methods, and this involved 
proceeding with the project as a unit. The only way 
that Cassady could hope to comply with his contractual 
obligation was to build accordingly, and to rely upon 
Felt to make the course of construction payments, as 
they became due. The failure of Felt to make payments 
in accordance ''Tith its contractual obligations, \Yas the 
real c.ause of the ultimate failure of the project. 
(d) Finding No. 39 in the Prudential Federal ease, 
which is like Finding No. 20 in the Felt case~ and Finding 
No. 18 in the Title Con1pany case, is crucial to all three 
of these cases. In the faee of a reeord replete 'Yith evi-
denee of breach after breaeh on the part of Felt, to 
whirh there is no dissent or dispute, and eorroborated 
by practically ever~T 'Yitness 'Yho took the stand, the 
court finds that Felt did not breach its contractual 
obligations to ('1n88ady or to the Hartford in any sub-
stantial 1nanner. These breaches "ill be discussed in 
fioJne detail under our Point II. infr.a. ,, .... e 1nerely note 
at this thne that the reeord was without dispute; that 
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there were repeated and continuous breaches on the part 
of Felt in failing to make course of construction pay-
ments in accordance with the construction contract; that 
there was failure to provide .a power connection in the 
inception of the work; that Felt did not pay Cassady 
for extra work and materials furnished by him, and that 
Felt without the written consent of Cassady, assigned 
its rights under the construction contract. 
(e) By Finding No. 11 in the Felt case the court 
finds that .at no time did the structures meet the require-
ments of the Veterans Administration. This is in direct 
conflict with the undisputed evidence, including that of-
fered by Felt itself, that in the initial phase.s of con-
struction, the workmanship was entirely satisfactory, 
and not until a financial breakdown had occurred, with-
out fault on the p.art of Cassady, did the inspectors 
start noting deficiencies. 
(f) \V e also note here our dissent to the court's 
finding No. 17 in the Title Company case, and No. 38 
in the Prudential Federal case to the effect that Pru-
dential Federal did not breach its contractual obliga-
tions. This will be more fully discussed under our Point 
III. 
POINT II. 
FELT WAS GUIUTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MATER-
IAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL O·BLIGATIONS 
TO 'THE HARTFORD'S PRINCIPAL, WHICH BREACHES 
CONTRIBU'TED 'TO ·CAUSE 'THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUS-
TAINED BY 'T'HE VARIOUS PARTIES TO 'THIS LITIGA-
TION. 
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It is elementary that an obligee would have no 
right to recover on the bond of a contractor, if it had 
itself breached the bond or the contract on which it was 
written, in any material respect. 10 Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, page 50. That rule must apply with 
even greater force here, where Felt and Cassady are 
really co-adventurers. Under the terms of the construc-
tion agreement Cassady agreed to do certain things in 
connection with the building program. Felt 1vas respons-
ible for other matters such as off-site improvements, 
water connections, etc. If the project was successful they 
were to share in the profits. Each had an interest in see-
ing the project successfully completed. l~ nder the.se cir-
cumstances Felt should not be permitted to recover from 
Cassady's surety, for reasons "~hich ''ere forcefully and 
effectively stated by Judge Kennedy in the case of U.S. 
vs. U. S. F1 • & G. Co. (D.C. \'{yo.) 4 F. Supp. 85-±, 855 as 
follows: 
"It seems quite evident that the rule of law 
should be that a joint adventurer [Felt] under 
these circumstances should not be permitted to 
recover upon a bond giYen to guarantee the ful-
fillnlent of the contract of his co-adYenturer [Cas-
sadY]. The duties of the contractor [Cassady] 
to fulfill the proYisions of his contract are 
no 1nore iinperatiYe than those of one "'\Yho is 
jointly interested \Yith hin1 in its success. The 
obligations are the sa1ne, to \Yit, to see that the 
con traet is fulfilled in eYe ry particular before 
a surety should be eon1pelled to ans\\Ter for the 
default. As a n1ntter of fact, the principal con-
tractor [Cassady] n1ight .as "Tell be entitled to 
recover for his O\\Tn default against his O\Yn surety 
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[Hartford] as to permit one jointly interested 
with him in its success [Felt] to do so. Such a 
rule of law would open the door to fraud of a 
serious type. ~c·ounsel have assured us that the 
books have been searched in v.ain for a judicial 
precedent and the court itself has verified their 
conclusion. Perhaps the lack of precedent arises 
from the fact that one has never before attempted 
to enforce his claim upon the bond of the prin-
cipal contractor who was his joint adventurer." 
That language was quoted with approval in Thea-
bald-Jansen Elec. Co. vs. P. H. Meyer) et al., 77 F. (2d) 
27. 
We have noted that Felt was guilty of substantial 
breaches in four important p.articulars. We herewith 
discuss them in some detail. 
A. FELT FAILED 1TO MAKE PAYMENTS TO CAS-
SADY SUBS'TANTIALLY IN ACCORDAN,CE WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF 'THE CONSTRUCTION CON-
'TRACT. 
This fact was recognized by nearly every witness 
called to testify in this case. Thomas Taylor, president 
and general manager of Prudential Federal, testified 
that there were insufficient funds to rn.ake payments to 
subcontractors, and that the proje·ct "was thirsting for 
necessary money," (T. 64); and " ... the project was 
bogging down due to lack of money," ( T. 65) ; and there 
was considerable difficulty ,all through the fall keeping 
payments to Cassady up with the work. (T. 67). 
Cassady testified that the first progress p.ayment 
was insufficient in amount, and that that situation con-
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tinued in existence throughout the course of the pro-
ject, even after the execution of the supplemental agree-
ment of February 1951. Mr. Cassady's testimony is 
illuminated by letters of complaint received from various 
subcontractors and materialmen which were received in 
evidence, and show the dissatisfaction that was develop-
ing. (T. 268, 275; Exs. H-32, H-33). Felt recognized that 
payments were in default, and that the project was im-
periled. In a series of letters to Prudential Federal, 
Felt repeatedly called attention to the fact that payments 
were behind construction, and urged that everything 
possible be done to expedite recording of mortgages and 
bring progress payments up to date. (Exs. H-13, H-14). 
In an undated letter, obviously written in the late sum-
mer or fall of 1950 to Prudential Federal, Felt, over 
the signature of Scott, recognized that the "situation in 
Morningside Heights could become grat~e." (Ex. H-15) 
(Emphasis ours). 
Felt's ''"·itness ~Iulcock, also testified that an orderly 
flow of funds into the project "~as necessary: that the 
problem """as n1ade n1ore acute by reason of the Kore.an 
War; that lark of available cash prevented the contractor 
from obtaining rash discounts, etc. (T. 158). He further 
testified that """ork progressed n1ore rapidly at the start 
than later. ( T. 155, 15·7). _A_ srunple l1o1ne, picked at 
rando1n hy the "·itness. lot 203, passed its first t"""O in-
spections satisfactorily. (T. 145, 155). Deficiencies were 
not noted until 1\fa.y of 1951 on the third inspection. (T. 
144-14-fl, 155, 156). This \vas typical of the situation with 
respeet to ot ht'r units. (Ex. F-~4). In other words the 
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project started out satisf.actorily, but the deficiencies 
in necessary monie.s inevitably led to a break-down, 
resulting in deficiencies of workmanship and materials. 
(T. 157, 158). The witness Scott also recognized that 
the absence of an orderly flow of mortgage funds into 
the project would inevitably defeat its success. (T. 157, 
158). There is no evidence in the record to the contrary. 
In the face of such a record, we do not understand 
how the court could find that Felt did not breach any 
material obligations. It must be borne in mind that Felt 
had an obligation to Cassady to pay according to the 
course of construction, .and that said obligation was not 
qu.alified as to recording mortgages, sales program or 
any other r~Lanner. It mu.st also be borne in mind that the 
bond specifically provided the "surety shall not be liable 
under the bond ... unless the Obligees ... shall make 
payment to the principal in reasonable compliance with 
the terms of said contract as to payments . . . " This 
breach alone is sufficient to defeat the rights of all the 
plaintiffs to recover in their three separate actions. As 
was so well s.aid by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of People of Puerto Rico vs. Title 
Guaranty Co., 227 U.S. 382, 335 S. Ct. 362: 
"If within the time allow~d for performance 
the plaintiff made performance impossible, it is 
unimaginable that any civilized system of law 
would allow it to re·cover upon the bond for a 
f.ailure to perform." 
B. WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CASSADY, FELT AS-
SIGNED ITS RIGHTS UNDER 'THE CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN, A FIRM O·F 
REAL E8TATE AGENTS. 
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The next item of breach, which is establi.shed with--
out contradiction in the record, is that Felt, without the 
consent of Cassady assigned a portion of its rights under 
the contract directly to Wright-Wirthlin, a firm of real 
estate salesmen. (Ex. H-31). This led to serious diffi-
culties at the time the partie.s were attempting to wind 
up the project, as is shown by the undisputed testimony 
of Wilson Taylor, and corrobated in part by Thon1as 
Taylor and other witnesses. There was available in Feb-
ruary, 1952, approximately $22,500 of mortgage funds. 
(T. 82, 85, 189). This would have been practically suf-
ficient to complete the project in accordance with \T. A. 
requirements. All of the interested partie.s were willing 
that said funds be so used. Ho,y·ever, because of the fact 
that Felt had 1nade an assignment to \\-.-right-\rirthlin 
of monies 'vhich it would otherwise have been entitled 
to receive, it 'vas impossible to apply these funds to 
the completion of the project. (T. 188-195). 
C. FEL'T NEGLECTED TO PROVIDE A POWER CON-
NECTION TO CASSADY, AS A RESULT OF WHICH 
HE WAS PUT TO THE EXPENSE OF HIRING AN 
ELE·CTRIC GENERATOR AT A COST IN EXCESS 
OF $2,000. 
The record sho\\~s 'Yithout dispute, and even Felf:S 
witnesses adn1itted, that there "~as a failure to furnish 
a power eonneetion ns required by the eonstruetion con-
tract. This oeenrred at the ineeption of the project ,,~hen 
1noney 'vn8 particularly scarce~ as a result of 'Yhich 
Ca~sady llPeP8Sarily ineurred expenses in an aDlOUnt in 
excess of $2,000 to provide a power generator at a tiine 
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when funds vvere dearly needed and should have been 
available for the payment of materialmen and subcon-
tractors. 
D. CASSADY PERF'ORMED EX'TRA LABOR A N D 
FURNISHED EXTRA MATERIAL, NOT CONTEM-
PLA'TED BY THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, FOR 
WHICH HE WAS NEVER PAID OR REIMBURSED 
BY F·E:LT. 
In our statement of facts herein, we detailed at 
some length items of extra expense incurred by ~cass.ady 
wholly undisputed by Felt or any other party to this 
litigation. There is no need to repeat the details of those 
extra expenditures here. In the aggregate those which 
are undisputed went into many thousands of dollars. It 
is significant that no officer of Felt was called to testify 
on its behalf, or to dispute the items of extra claimed 
by Cassady. The only witness called at all by Felt was 
Scott, whose connection with Felt terminated in the 
late winter or spring of 1951, who had no knowledge of 
what transpired after that time in connection with the 
project, and who did not participate in any way in the 
meetings where the m.atter of extra expenses vvas dis-
cussed. This failure on the part of Felt to rebut the 
evidence amounts to a tacit admission of its veracity. 
In summary, the record shows without dispute that 
Felt never made payment to Cassady in acordance with 
the actual stage of construction, i.e., in accordance with 
its contractual .agreement; that this failure imrnediately 
resulted in dissatisfaction among materialmen and sub-
contractors with consequent disharmony, loss of eoordin-
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ation, loss of efficiency, loss of buying power, and com-
plete disintegration of effective organization; that Felt 
failed to reimburse Cassady for · items of extra work 
and expense to the further prejudice of the work; that 
Felt failed to provide a required power connection to 
the further detriment of Cassady; and that Felt, with-
out the consent of Cassady, and in violation of its con-
tractual obligations, assigned a portion of its rights 
under it.s contract with Cassady, and that such assign-
ment was a substantial impediment contributing to the 
ultimate failure to complete the ·construction in accord-
ance with \T. A. requirements. 
POINT III. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTAN-
TIAL AND MATERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRAC-
TUAL OBLIGATIONS, AND FAILED TO TAKE STEPS TO 
PREVENT OR MINIMIZE THE DAMAGES, WHICH CON-
TRIBUTED TO CAUSE THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUS-
TAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGA-
TION. 
A. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL FAILED TO OBTAIN LIEN 
WAIVERS FROM ACCOUNTANTS CON·TRARY TO 
ITS OBLIGATIONS BOTH UNDER THE LOAN 
AGREEMENT AND THE DISBURSING AGREE-
MENT. 
\\\) haY() ah·ead~~ discussed this 1natter under Point 
I hereof, and \\~r· enn add nothing to it at this point. 
B. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL NEGLECTED TO HOLD 
UP PAYMEN'TS OR TO TAKE ANY OTHER ACTION 
TO REQUIRE THAT DEFECTIVE WORK ON THE 
PART OF CASSADY BE CORRECTED. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
Under both the loan agreement and the supplemental 
agreement Prudential Federal had the right to withhold 
the disbursement of any funds until Cassady's work had 
been approved by the V.A. inspector. Prudential Federal 
regularly received reports of the V.A. inspector, and it 
also had its own inspector on the job. It therefore was 
fully apprised as to any deficiencies in workmanship. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it did absolutely nothing to 
require or compel Cassady to bring his work into line 
with V.A. requirements. We anticipate that Prudential 
Federal's attorneys will contend that the contractual 
provi.sions above referred to, were optional or elective 
with Pru~ential Federal, and not mandatory. That may 
well be true, in the sense that Prudential Federal would 
not be liable in damages to other parties for failure to 
take the action authorized by contract. It did, however, 
apart from any contractual obligation, have a common 
law duty to mitigate its own damages. Had it held up 
payments to Cassady as soon as deficiencies in workman-
ship were noted, the errors could have been readily cor-
rected, instead of being compounded. Cassady would 
either have been required to correct the deficiencies or a 
new contractor would have been engaged to complete the 
work. While this might not have completely eliminated 
the loss, it would have substantially mitigated it. It does 
not appear that Prudential Federal even took the trouble 
to obtain bids from other contractors for completing the 
work when it became apparent that Cassady could not 
or would not complete in accordance with V.A. require-
ments. Instead, it sat supinely by, disbursing funds until 
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the mortgage proceeds were exhausted, apparently heed-
less of the consequences, and content to let the project 
"go to p·ot" and to salvage its profit from the assets of 
the bonding company. 
·C. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL FAILED TO TAKE OVER 
THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT, AS IT HAD 
THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DO. 
This sub-point is very closely allied with the one 
immediately preceding. 1Tnder both the loan agreement 
and the supplemental agreement, Prudential Federal had 
the right, upon the failure to complete the construction 
within the time provided by said contracts, to take over 
the project and complete the construction using the mort-
gage loan funds for that purpose. Thus, any time after 
June 1, 1951, Prudential Federal could ha\e taken over 
and con1pleted the project. ~\s late as February 1952, the 
project could haYe been completed in accordance with 
\r.A. require1nents, according to the undisputed evidence 
for about $26,500. There \Vas then available in undis-
bursed 1nortgage funds approxin1ately $:2:2,500, so even at 
that late date, the project could haYe been con1pleted for 
a loss of approxiJ.nately $4,000. Still Prudential Federal 
was un\Yilling to take any action. and not until..._\.ugust of 
1952 did it even take the trouble to declare a default. 
If it~ failure in thi~ regard "~as not a breach of any af-
firlllatiYP eontraetual obligation, it \\~as at least a breach 
o I' its eouunon In'" duty to nlitigate its drunages, and it 
should not no\\· be per1nitted to recoYer fro1n the bonding 
e<nnpany those profit~ \Yhieh it ney~·r needed to have lost, 
had it but taken a f~·",. shnple steps in its o'vn interest. 
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POIN·T IV. 
THE COURT DREW ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, BASED UPON FACTS UNSUPPORTED BY EVI-
DENCE, AND CON'TRARY TO FAMILIAR PRINCIPLES OF 
LAW. 
POINT V. 
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND, A 
BREACH UPON THE PART OF ANY OF 'THE OBLIGEES, 
WOULD DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL, AND THERE-
FORE ~THE BREACHES ON THE PART OF BOTH FELT 
AND PRUDEN·TIAL DEFEAT THE RIGHT'S OF ALL OBLI-
GEES. 
Points I\T and \T involve essentially the same ques-
tions, and n1ay be discussed together. Both involve the 
correct interpretation of two important provisions of the 
bond. It is and always has been the contention of the 
Hartford, that a breach upon the part of any of the 
obligees, would operate to exonerate the surety of and 
from any and all liability to either or any of the obligees. 
In making this contention \Ve rely upon five separate 
grounds as set forth below. 
A. THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF 
THE BOND MAKES IT CLEAR THAT A BREACH 
UPON THE PART OF ANY OF THE OBLIGEES RE-
LEASES 'THE SURETY AS TO ALL OF THEM. 
The clear language of the bond itself, indicates that 
the protection afforded by the bond is subject to perform-
ance, by each .and all of the obligees. The last whereas 
clause of the bond contains the following language : 
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"Said protection to be subject to the perform-
ance by the LENDER OBLIGEE, the TITLE 
OBLIGEE and the OWNER OBLIGEE of their 
respective obligations to the PRINCIPAL in con-
nection with said contract; ***" (Emphasis ours.) 
Condition 3 of the bond provides as follows: 
"The SURETY shall not be liable unde-r this 
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, WJtless 
the Obligees, or either of them, shall rttake pay-
rnents to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compli-
ance with the terms of said contract as to pay-
ments, and each shall perform all other obliga-
tions to be performed by each obligee under said 
contract at the time and in the manner therein set 
forth." (Emphasis ours.) 
vV e do not see that an~ meaning, other than that 
ascribed by the surety to the foregoing language can be 
given to it. Effect and n1eaning must be given to all of 
the language used in the bond. It is an elementaTy prin-
ciple of contract la"~, that a part~ who breaches an agree-
Inent, is not entitled to look to the other party for dam-
ages. "An obligee would have no right to recover on the 
bond of a contractor, if it had itself breached the bond 
in any 1naterial respect.~~ 10 .... -\.ppleman, Insurance Law 
& Practice, p. 51. Therefore~ there "~ould have been no 
pojnt whatsoever in e1nploying the foregoing language if 
the 1 >arties had 1neant nothing n1ore than that a breach 
by one obli<ree 'vould IuerelY bar that oblio-ee from re-
., t"'t • 0 
eovery. OhYiously the parties intended son1e thing more 
than this, and tht:•y u,sed language ""hich to us seen1s per-
fectly clear. Condition 3 recites that the usurety shall 
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not be liable" unless each shall perform all of the obliga-
tions to be performed by each obligee under the contract 
at the time and in the rnanner therein set forth. It is 
difficult to conceive what language the parties might 
have used to express more clearly their intent. Nor can 
any other meaning be reasonably ascribed to the afore-
said language. 
B. THE CIRCUM8TAN·CES OF THE PARTIES AT THE 
TIME THE BOND WAS WRIT'TEN, MAKE IT CLEAR 
THAT IT MUST HAVE BEEN THE INTENTION OF 
THE PARTIES THAT THE SURETY WOULD NOT 
BE LIABLE UNLESS EACH OF THE OBLIGEES 
PERFORMED ITS OBLIGATION. 
While vve do not believe that the language of the 
bond is ambiguous, if any ambiguity exists a resort to 
extrinsic evidence will certainly clarify the same. 
Let us look to the circumstances of the parties at the 
time the bond was signed, in the light of which the bond 
must be construed. 9 Appleman, Insurance La-\v and 
Practice, p. 68; Continental Bank v. Stewart, 4 Ut. (2d) 
228, 291 Pac. (2d) 890. The evidence shows without dis-
pute that Cassady's financial statement was unsatis-
factory, and that he was having considerable difficulty 
in obtaining a bond. Felt was so uncertain as to Cassa-
dy's financial position, that it was seriously considering 
the employment of .another contractor to take on this 
work. Negotiations to obtain a bond in Salt Lake City 
were completely without avail, and the bond was finally 
written in Los Angeles with the financial backing of a 
third party brought into the picture by Cassady. The con-
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struction which Prudential Federal and the Title Com-
pany would have the court place on the bond, would make 
the bonding company a surety not only for 'Cassady, but 
also for Felt. In view of Cassady's precarious financial 
position, it must have been apparent to all concerned, 
that this project could succeed only if Cassady received 
progress payments timely, and had an orderly flow of 
mortgage funds into the project to keep payments to 
materialmen and suppliers up to date. It is inconceivable 
that in light of this background, the bonding company 
would have undertaken to guarantee performance on the 
part of Cassady without insisting that every party to the 
obligation fully perform its contract. To construe other-
wise, would permit Felt to deliberately shipwreck the 
project and then throw the entire loss on the bonding 
company. 
C. THE LAN·GUAGE OF THE BOND WAS NOT DRAFT-
ED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SURETY COM-
PANY, BU'T RATHER BY REPRESENTATIVES OF 
'T'HE OBLIGEES, AND PARTICULARLY PRUDEN-
'TIAL FEDERAL, AND THEREFORE ANY AMBIG-
UITIES IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE BOND 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED MOST S T R 0 N G L Y 
AGAINST THE 0 B L I GEES RATHER THAN 
AGAINST THE SURETY. 
While 've recognize that ordinarily an1biguous lan-
guage of a bond \Yill be construed 1nost strongly against 
a surety con1pany, tha:t rule should have no application 
in this case. The rule found its origin in the general prin-
ciple that in construing contract docun1ents, ambiguous 
language \Yill be construed 1nost strongly against the 
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party who employed it. However, that reason is wholly 
non-existent in the case at bar. This bond was not on 
a printed forn1, carefully drawn and prepared by a bat-
tery of legal experts for the surety, as is frequently the 
c.ase. On the contrary, the language is not that of the 
surety at all. The stipulations and admissions of Pru-
dential Federal's attorney, and the undisputed testi-
mony of C. P. Cassady, Deco \Tan Horn, and Mr. Black-
burn, establish beyond question, that the bond form 
suggested by the Hartford w.as wholly rejected, and the 
bond was finally written in accordance with a form pre-
pared by repre.sentatives of Prudential Federal. The 
language of the bond on which the Hartford relies, is 
language drafted by Prudential Feder.al's attorney. 
This comes within the provision of the Restatement 
of Contracts, Sec. 236 (d) : 
\ 
"Where words or other manifestations of in-
tention bear more than one reasonable meaning an 
interpretation is preferred which operates more 
strongly ag.ainst the party from whom they pro-
ceed, unles.s their use by him is prescribed by law." 
D. THE OBLIGEES THEMSELVES, AND PARTICU-
LARLY PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL, INTERPRETED 
THE BOND, ·THE SAME AS THE SURETY INTER-
PRETED THE BOND, AND ALL PARTIES INTER--
PRETED IT, AS THE ~SURETY NOW IN·TERPRETS 
IT. 
The construction adopted by the bonding company 
was set forth by the surety's attorney, l\fr. Wilson E. 
Taylor in a letter as early as September, 1952, addressed 
to Prudential Federal's attorney, to which no dissent 
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was made. The undisputed te.stimony of Mr. Wilson E. 
Taylor shows that Prudential Federal's attorney con-
curred in this interpretation in an oral conference at San 
Francisco in September of 1952. The acts of the parties, 
and the interpretation which they placed on the language 
of the bond, is good evidence of the intention of the par-
ties. 
E. UNDER WELL ESTABLISHED LAW, THIS COURT 
CANNOT REFUSE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE 
PLAIN MEANING AND INTENT OF THE LANG-
UAGE USED BY 'THE PARTIES, AND AS THE 
SURETY HAS LIMITED ITS LIABILITY IN APT 
TERMS, THE COURT CANNOT UNDER ·THE GUISE 
OF CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT, ~CREATE A 
GREATER LIABILITY THAN THE SURETY CON-
TRACTED. 
It is not for the court to ascribe to the language of 
the parties .a meaning never intended by them. 
In th~e early case of Smith v. Bowman, (Ut.), 88 Pac. 
687, this court _said: 
"In deter1nining the true intention of the par-
ties to the bond in question, we must look not to 
disconnected sentences, or only a portion of a 
sentence, taken from the context, but we must 
look at the bond as a \vhole, and consider it in con-
nection with the contract attached to it and for the 
security of which it was given. *** The parties 
to the bond had the undoubted right to contract 
as to who should and who should not be benefited 
by its obligations. *** 
"*** The parties having thus expressed them-
selves unambiguously, we can see no reason \vhy 
this court should strain rafter re.asons for thwart-
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ing their obvious purpose in an endeavor to read 
some one into the bond not intended to be bene-
fited by it. *** These cases but illustrate the 
principle that the liability of a surety on his bond 
is entirely dependent upon his: covenants :and 
agreements so construed as not to extend the 
liability by implication beyond the terms of his 
contract. ***'' (Emphasis ours.) 
The rule there laid down, has been invariably fol-
lowed since that time. In Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, (Ut.), 
148 Pac. 427, this court, speaking through Justice Frick, 
said: 
"It certainly cannot be questioned that appel-
lant, like all other persons, had a right to limit 
and define the precise obligations it was willing 
to and did assume, regardless of the terms of the 
contract. ***'' (Emphasis ours.) 
And further : 
"This being so, we have no right to ext,end 
the scope and effect of the bond beyond what the 
parties thereto, from the language used by them, 
must have intended it should have. Nor are we 
permitted to have recourse to only a few general 
expressions in order to dete~rmine the intention 
of the parties. In order to arrive at the true in-
tention of the parties, .all that is said in the bond 
must be considered and where the bond contains 
express restrictions and limitations, as is the case 
here, the courts have no right to look to other in-
struments for the purpose of extending the scope 
and effect of the bond. *** When we come to lay 
down the rules of construction, however, and give 
scope and effect to the language used by the par-
ties in written contracts or documents, all parties 
h.ave the right to insist that we shall be careful 
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in not extending the scope and effect of their 
language beyond what they intended it to have, 
and to that end they have a right to insist that 
court~ be bound by the usual ordinary rules of 
construction. The que1stion here is, not whether 
under the circumstances, it would not be more just 
to permit respondent to recover on the bond; but 
the question is whether it was the intention of the 
pHrties to the bond that it should have the right 
to do so. ***" (Emphasis our:s.) 
And further : 
"Where limitations and restrictions are placed 
in a BOND IN EXPRESS TERMS, it requires 
no argument to prove that rights in conflict with 
or in derogation of such limitations and restric-
tions may not be inferred and enforced. To do so 
would be to violate every canon of interpretation." 
(Emphasi.s ours.) 
In a concurring opinion Chief J ustiee Straup said: 
"I concur. In determining the meaning of a 
written contract, the primary factor is to ascertain 
the intention of the parties. That largely is to be 
ascertained from the language en1ployed by them. 
As to sureties, their liability is not to be extended 
by implication beyond the ternzs of their contract. 
They have the right to stand strictly on the ex-
press terms of it a1~d to insist that they be uot 
held responsible for any liability or obligation not 
directly expressed U'it hin it. ,~Vhen on such con-
sideration the intention of the parties as so ex-
pressed is once ascertained~ then the contract 'vith 
such ascertained intention is given effect and ap-
plied, not liberally or strictly, nor generously or 
niggardly, but truly eon1pletely~ and confor1nably 
with such ascertained intent of the parties." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
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In W. H. Walker Realty Co. v. A1nerican SuretJl 
Co. of N.Y., (Ut.), 211 Pac. 998, this court s.aid: 
"The plain stipulations of the undertaking 
of a surety company which is paid for undertaking 
the risk will be enforced in its favor the same as 
those of a gratuitous surety." 
In Paxton v. Spencer, (Ut.), 265 Pac. 751, the rule 
was reiterated in the following succinct language: 
"The liability of the surety must be deter-
mined and measured by the terms of the bond." 
Perhaps the most recent expression is found in Boise-
Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., (Ut.), 280 
Pac. (2d) 418, where this court quoted with approval from 
Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, supra, as follows: 
" 'Appellant, like all others competent to con-
tract, had the right to enter into just such a con-
tract as it saw fit and to limit its obligations in 
any particular it deemed proper, and, if the, com-
pany or contractor were dissatisfied with the 
limitations contained in the bond as executed, 
either, or both could refuse to accept it.' " 
The Utah decisions are entirely harmonious with 
the general rule as set forth by the text writers. See 50 
Am. Jur. 1114-1115; 4 Williston on Contracts, pages 
3491-2, 3547; 5 Couch's Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, 
pages 4262 to 4267; Stearns, Law of Suretyship, Fifth 
Ed. page.s 12, 13 and 107; Restatement of Security, Sec. 
88. 
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POINT VI. 
FELT BEING A NON-RESIDEN'T CORPORATION AND 
HAVING FORFEITED I1TS ·CORPORATE FRANCHISE TO 
DO BUSINESS IN THIS STA1TE, HAS NO STANDING TO 
MAINTAIN ITS ACTION IN THE U·TAH COURTS. 
We previously noted that Felt was incorporated as a 
Nevada corporation in the spring of 1950, and thereafter 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. In 1952, 
prior to the commencement of the litigation between the 
several lien claimants on the one hand and Felt, Pruden-
tial Federal and Hartford on the other, Felt forfeited 
its franchise to do business in the State of Utah, for fail-
ure to pay taxes. Its franchise was subsequently rein-
stated in accordance with Utah law, but was again for-
feited during the pendency of the instant litigation. It 
has never been reinstated, and had not been reinstated 
up to the time of trial of the cases at bar. It is the con-
tention of the I-Iartford, First: That \Yhen Felt's corpo-
rate rights in Utah were forfeited for non-payment of 
taxes, any rights which it then had were forever lost, 
and could not be revived or reinstated by again qualify-
ing to do business in Utah; and Secondly, even if such 
rights were not forever lost, Felt in any event had no 
right to maintain the instant suit against the Hartford 
at a time when its corporate rights in l~tah had been 
forfeited. 
Se:e. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows: 
''If a tax con1puted and levied hereunder is 
not paid before 5 o'clock p.In. on the last day of 
the eleventh n1onth after the date of delinquency, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
53 
the corporate powers, rights .and privileges of the 
delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corpora-
tion, shall be suspended, and if a foreign corpora-
tion, it shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do 
intrastate business in this state.'' (Italics ours.) 
It will be noted that a distinction is made between 
domestic and foreign corpor.a tions. Whereas, the rights 
of domestic corporations are merely "suspended" for 
non-payment of taxes, the rights of foreign corporations 
are "forfeited." The words "suspend" and "forfeit" do 
not earry the same legal significance, and it appears to 
us quite obvious that the Legislature intended to make .a 
distinction between the consequences of non-payment of 
taxes on domestic and foreign corporations. 
The significance to be attached to the word "sus-
pend" was set forth by the Missouri Court in construing 
a statute somewhat similar to ours in Leibson v. Henry, 
356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. (2d) 310, as follows: 
" 'Suspend' ordinarily means temporary ces-
sation; in its natural signification, something 
which may not be permanent rather th.an that 
which necessarily is so; ***" 
The word "forfeit" carries .a different connotation. 
In 23 Am. Jur., commencing at page 599, it is defined 
as follows: 
"In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a 
divestiture of property without compensation, in 
consequence of a default or an offense, and the 
term is used in such a sense in this article. A 
forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of 
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punishment, not by the mere convention of the 
p.arties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a 
prescribed course of conduct." 
And further: 
"The primary and legal meaning of the word 
'forfeit' is 'to lose.' ". 
The following definitions are found in Black'~ Law 
Dictionary, 3rd Ed. : 
"To lose an estate, a franchise, or other prop-
erty belonging to one, by the act of the law, and 
as a consequence of some misfeasance, negligence, 
or omission. *** 
"*** To incur loss through some fault, omis-
_sion, error, or offense; loss. ***" 
There are many cases to the same effect. As illus-
trative we cite the following: State v. Cook, (La. App.), 
13 So. (2d) 473, quoting \Vith approval the A1nerican 
Jurisprudence definition above set forth; Rekas v. Dop-
kavich, 362 Pa. 292, 66 A. (2d) 230, \Vhere the court said: 
"As a verb, 'forfeit' in its p-rimary sense 
means 'to lose'; and that is also its legal meaning. 
2'6 C.J. Sec. 4, p. 891, 37 C.J.S., Forfeit; 23 A1n. 
J ur. Sec. 2, p. 599.", 
and Sands v. I-Iolbert_. 93 ''T· \~a. 574, 117 S.E. 896, where 
the court said: 
"To forfeit is to incur loss through some fault, 
o1nission, error, or offense. It is synon)~nous with 
'loss.' " 
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Under the plain and unequivocal language of the 
statute, .any rights which Felt 1nay ever have had to pro-
ceed against the Hartford were forfeited and forever lost, 
when its franchise was revoked for non-payment of taxes 
in 1953. Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth the di.sa-
bilities of non-complying foreign corporations. In so far 
as material here, that statute provides as follows: 
"Any foreign corporation doing business 
within this state and failing to comply with the 
provisions of Sections 16-8-1, and 16-8-2, shall not 
be entitled to the benefit of the laws of this state 
relating to corporations, and shall not sue, prose-
cute or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross complaint or proceeding in any of the courts 
of this state on any claim, interest or demand 
arising or growing out of or founded on any tort 
occurring, or of any contract, agreement or trans-
action made or entered into, in this state by such 
corporation or by its assignors or by any person 
from, through or under whom it derives its inter-
est or title or any part thereof." (Emphasis ours.) 
Under this .statute, it is clear beyond question, that 
Felt had no right to maintain the instant suit in the Utah 
courts. Such is the uniform effect given to such statutes 
wherever they have been construed by the courts. In 
Aalwyns Law Institute v. Mart in, (Cal.), 159 Pac. 158, 
the court said : 
"When a corporation has failed to pay its 
license tax, and a forfeiture of its charter has been 
declared, it ceases to be a corporation." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
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In the later case of U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Matthews, 
(Cal. App.), 274 Pac. 769, the court said: 
"In consequence of the fact that in 1907 the 
plaintiff corporation failed to pay its state cor-
poration license tax, its corporate charter was 
at that time forfeited." 
And the court further ,said : 
"That upon the forfeiture of the license of a 
corporation it is dead, and, consequently, rendered 
incapable of performing any act, is attested by a 
long line of authoritie·s in this state. See Rossi v. 
Claire, 186 ·Cal. 544, 549, 199 P. 1042; Sharp v. 
Eagle Lake Lumber Co., 60 Cal. App. 386, 389, 
212 P. 933; Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150 
Cal. 575, 580, 89 P. 335, Newhall v. Western Zinc 
Min. Co., 164 Cal. 380, 128 P. 1040; \-.-an Langing-
ham v. United Tuna Packers, 189 Cal. 353, 208 P. 
973. It therefore becomes apparent that the cor-
poration itself had no power to assign the judg-
ment. *** 
* * * 
"In the case of Aalwyn's L.aw Institute v. 
Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 159 P. 158, in principle it is 
held that when a corporation has failed to pay its 
license tax, and by reason thereof its charter has 
been forfeited, the corporation is de·ad, and that in 
its behalf the trustees of the corporation are the 
only persons or representatives \vho have any 
standing in court. It is therefore n1anifest that as 
the corporation itself has no po\ver or capacity 
to act in the prenrises, .and as its directors, acting 
as trustees for the corporation, gave no notice of 
appeal, the notice purporting to emanate fron1 the 
corporation was a nullity. \r enable Bros. v. South-
ern Granite ~c·o., 135 Ga. 508, 69 S.E. 822, 32 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 446." 
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Perhaps the most recent decision on that subject 
from that jurisdiction is Reed v. Norman) ( C.al. App.), 
302 Pac. ( 2d) 690, where the court said : 
"Respondents Norman and Haskins move to 
dismiss plaintiff's appeal upon this ground: That 
the complaint assert.s an alleged cause of action 
belonging to defendant Norman Decorating Co., 
Inc., a domestic corporation, and plaintiff's action, 
brought by him as a stockholder, is derivative in 
nature; that the corporate right to do business 
has been suspended for nonpayment of its fran-
chise tax; that there has been no reinstatement or 
revivor of that right, and hence the corporation 
cannot pro.secute or defend any suit; *** 
* * * 
"During such suspension the corporate disa-
bility extends to the defense of an action and the 
right of appeal from an adverse judgment. Boyle 
v. Lakeview Creamery c·o., 9 C.al. 2d 16, 19-20-68 
P. 2d 968; Fidelity lVIetal Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cal. 
App. 2d 377, 383, 175 P. 2d 592. *** 
* >Ill * 
"*** As the court declared in the Ransome-
Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 188 ~c·al. 
393, 397, 205 P. 446, 448: 'During the time its 
taxes were unpaid, petitioner was shorn of all 
rights save those expressly reserved by the stat-
utes.' The conclusion which we are forced to draw 
is that the appellant corporation has lost the right 
to defend the suit in question, and since it has no 
right to defend, it has no right to appeal from 
an adverse decision. See, also 6A Cal. J ur. No. 
864, p. 1469. That c.ase is controlling here. There 
is no right to maintain this action." 
See also the annotation in 97 A.L.R. pp. 483-484, 
where it is said: 
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"The power of a corporation to sue and to be 
sued is extinguished at common law when its ex-
istence is terminated; and this extinction involves, 
as a matter of procedure, the abatement of any 
action to which it may he a party, pending at the 
time of its dis.solution, or the bar of any subse-
quently commenced action." 
The case closest in point of fact which our research 
has discovered, and therefore the one we consider most 
helpful on this point, is Leibson v. Henry; 356 1\Io. 953, 
204 S.W. (2d) 310. In that case the Court construed the 
provisions of .a l\1issouri statute, somewhat similar to our 
own, 'vhich provided as follows: 
"If any corporation shall fail to comply with 
the provisions of this article on or before the 
thirty-first day of December, the corporate rights 
and privileges of such corporation shall be for-
feited, and th.e Secretary of State shall thereupon 
cancel the certificate, or license, of such corpo-
ration by .appropriate entry on the margin of the 
record thereof, whereupon all the powers, privi-
leges and franchises conferred upon such eorpora-
tion by such certificate, or license, shall subject 
to rescission as in this article proYided, cease 
and determine,***" (Emphasis ours.) 
The court then quoted ''""'ith approval fron1 the deci-
sion in State v. A.B. Collins & Co., 3-± F. Supp. 550, as 
follows: 
"It vvould be difficult to conceive of any lan-
guage 'vhich could be n1ore expressive of dissolu-
tion of corporate existence than the language used 
in this statute. Failure to con1ply """ith the pro-
visions of la,v, so says the statute, ipso facto re-
sults in the forfeiting of the corporate rights and 
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privileges of such corporation. The Secretary of 
State does not forfeit those rights and privileges. 
They ,are ipso facto forfeited." (Emphasis ours.) 
The court then went on to say: 
"It is not even debatable that mere suspension 
(to say nothing of forfeiture) of corporate powers 
would of necessity so disable a corporation as 
to bring about at least a temporary cessation of 
its usual and ordinary business during the period 
of suspension, bec.au.se in the absence of its fran-
chise, or license, it could lawfully do nothing." 
And it concluded as follows : 
"From the plain language of the statute, and 
upon the authority of the cases cited, our conclu-
sion is that the effect of a forfeiture as provided 
in section 5091 to ipso facto, completely conclude 
the corporate entity, and without judicial action 
except and subject to the right of re.scission upon 
the .application and showing required by Sec. 
5093." 
POINT VII. 
THE ;TITLE COMPANY DID NOT SUSTAIN ANY COM-
PENSABLE DAMAGE, AND THEREFORE IS NOT EN~ 
TITLED 'TO RECOVER ANYTHING FROM THE HART-
FORD. 
It is of course the general rule that attorneys' fees 
are not recoverable items of damage unless specifically 
stipulated for by contract, or unless authorized by some 
special statute. It is stated thus in 15 Am. Jur. pp. 550-51, 
Damages Sec. 142 : 
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"As a gener.al rule, in the absence of any con-
tractual or statutory liability therefor, attorneys' 
fees and expenses incurr·ed by the plaintiff or 
which the plaintiff is obligated to pay, in the liti-
gation of his claim against the defendant, aside 
from usual court costs, are not recoverable as an 
item of damages, either in an action ex contractu 
or an action ex delicto. Nor are attorneys' fees 
and other expenses of former litigation, particu-
larly suits prosecuted by the plaintiff against the 
defendant, recoverable in a subseque1~t action." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
To the same effect in Oleck on Damages, p. 596, Sec. 
287: 
"As a general rule, litigation expenses and 
costs are not recoverable as costs in actions at 
law. This general rule appJies to such litig.ation 
expenses as attorneys' fees." 
The rule applies equally to prior litigation as to liti-
gation then in suit. Oleck on Damages, p. 603, Sec. 290: 
"The rule is also 'vell established that attor-
ney fees and the ordinary expenses and burdens 
of litigation are not allo,vable to the successful 
party in the .absence of a statute, or in the absence 
of .some agreen1ent or stipulation specially au-
thorizing the allowance thereof, and this rule 
applies equally in courts of la":-- and in courts of 
equity." 
The reasons for the rule are ''"'·ell explained by the 
author at pages 605-607, Sec. 290 .as follows : 
"The policy of the rule is obvious. If the 
wrongful conduct of a defendant causing the 
plaintiff to sue him would give rise to an inde-
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pendent tort .and a separate cause of action, there 
would be no end to the litigation, for immediately 
upon the entry of judgment the plaintiff would 
start another action against the defendant for 
his attorney fees and expenses incurred in obtain-
ing the preceding judgment. ***When a defendant 
breache.s a lease, violates the terms of a contract, 
commits a tort, misrepresents goods sold, unlaw-
fully retains the personal property of the plain-
tiff, or remains in possession of real estate after 
the expiration of his tenancy, necessitating pro-
ceedings, his conduct is wrongful and may require 
.a suit against him by the plaintiff. Under our 
jurisprudence the defendant may present any 
defense to such an action that he may have or that 
he may deem expedient, and in so doing he will 
not be subjecting himself to a second suit by the 
plaintiff based on the wrongful conduct of the de-
fendant in causing the plaintiff to sue him or in 
defending the .action. The rule is the same even 
though the wrongful conduct of the defendant is 
willful, intentional, malicious or fraudulent. 
* * * 
"*** It is obvious that if the defendant in the 
Smith case, supra, could not maintain an action 
for damages which he had suffered by an un-
founded prosecution, the converse of the proposi-
tion would be true, that is, a plaintiff can not bring 
an action against a defendant who has made a 
groundless and causeless defense. Equal justice 
forbids treating one party to a suit more generous-
ly than the other." 
Utah is committed to this rule. See Dahl v. Prince, 
119 Ut. 556, 230 P. (2d) 328, wher,e this court said: 
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"With respect to the award of $200 for attor-
ney fees as damages for depriving plaintiff of 
possession by writ of attachment, the judgment 
was clearly erroneou_s. There was no contract 
involved which authorized the award of counsel 
fees and there was no basis for .an award of puni-
tive damages. See 15 Am. J ur. p. 551, 25 C.J.S. 
Damages, Sec. 50, p. 531, and Drinkhouse v. Van 
Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 P. 869. Cf. St. Joseph 
Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 P. 305, 
25 ALR 569." 
The title company has pointed neither to an·y con-
tractual provision nor to any statute which 'vould circum-
vent the general rule and permit it to recover attorney~s 
fee_s as general da1nages in this litigation. It stands in 
exactly the same position as would have Prudential Fed-
eral, had it not had the benefit of title insurance, and had 
had the expense of defending itself in the prior litigation. 
In that suit, the legal acts of Prudential Federal were 
called into question. Substantial rights "\Yere asserted 
against it, not only concerning priority of liens but also 
that Prudential Federal was holding certain monies 
which should have been paid to others. lTltimately, Pru-
dential Federal contributed $10,000 to"~ard a settlen1ent 
of the lien claims. It see1ns clear beyond question that if 
Prudential Federal had borne its o"\vn defense expenses 
in the lien claim litigation, it could not no'v recover then1 
from the Hartford, as an ite1n of general damages. We 
do not see ho'v the title ron1pany can be in any better 
position. 
As to court co.sts, they are a'vnrded as of course to 
the prevailing party. Ho,vever, in the prior litigation 
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there was no prevailing party. There was a general 
• compromise of rights to which all parties to that litigation 
agreed. Therefore neither was entitled to recover costs 
against the other. Since Prudential Federal could not, 
under any view of the case, recover court costs in the 
prior litigation, its insurer can be in no better position 
in the instant suit. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment in favor of Felt should be reversed 
for the following reasons : 
1. Felt was guilty of substantial and material 
breaches of its contractual obligations to Hartford's 
principal. 
2. Felt was a co-adventurer with Hartford's prin-
cipal and therefore has no right to recover against the 
Hartford for loss of profits. 
3. Prudential Federal was guilty of substantial and 
mate-rial breaches, which under the terms of the bond 
would defeat Felt's rights to recover against the Hart-
ford. 
4. Any rights which Felt may have acquired, were 
forfeited under the terms and provisions of Sec. 59-13-
61, U. C.A., 1953. 
5. F:elt has no standing to maintain this action in 
the Utah Courts under the provisions of Sec. 16-9-3, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
The judgment in favor of Prudential Federal should 
be reversed for the following reasons : 
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1. Prudential F·ederal was. guilty of substantial 
and material breaches of its contractual obligations. 
2. Prudential Federal failed to take reasonable 
.steps to mitigate its damages. 
3. Felt was guilty of substantial and material 
breaches of its contractual obligations, which under the 
terms of the bond defeat any rights which Prudential 
Federal might have against the Hartford. 
The judgment in favor of the Title Company should 
be reversed for the following grounds and reasons: 
1. Both Felt and Prudential Federal were guilt~T of 
sub.stantial and material breaches, \vhich under the terms 
of the bond, defeat any rights which the Title Company 
might assert against the Hartford. 
2. The Title Company has not sustained any conl-
pensable damage. 
In each case the judgments should be reversed with 
directions to enter judg1nent in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff, no cau.se of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Company 
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